Wayne Coombs v. David DiGuglielmo by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-25-2014 
Wayne Coombs v. David DiGuglielmo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Wayne Coombs v. David DiGuglielmo" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 876. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/876 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
                                  NOT PRECDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-1147 
____________ 
 
WAYNE COOMBS 
 
v.  
 
DAVID DIGUGLIELMO;  
DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA, 
          Appellants 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 2-04-cv-01841) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
       
 
Argued on March 6, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 25, 2014) 
 
Molly S. Lorber, Esquire (Argued) 
Assistant District Attorney 
Thomas W. Dolgenos, Esq. 
Chief, Federal Litigation 
Philadelphia Office of District Attorney 
Three South Penn Square 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
   Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
 
2 
 
Leon A. Williams, Esquire (Argued) 
327 South 13
th
 Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 
   Counsel for Appellee 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 The District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia, the Attorney General of 
Pennsylvania, and David DiGuglielmo, the former Superintendent of the State 
Correctional Institution at Graterford appeal the District Court’s order sustaining Wayne 
Coombs’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and granting 
his habeas corpus petition for the prosecutor’s strike of a prospective juror in violation of 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  For the reasons that follow, we will reverse. 
I. Background 
 Coombs was arrested on February 22, 2000, for a series of robberies that occurred 
in Philadelphia during the winter of 1999–2000.  His September 2001 trial in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ended with a hung jury. 
 Coombs was re-tried in November 2001.  On the first day of jury selection, the 
prosecutor raised a “reverse Batson” challenge against defense counsel’s use of 
peremptory strikes to strike three white jurors.  Defense counsel then raised his own 
Batson challenge.  The prosecutor provided race-neutral reasons for the strikes.  The 
judge denied both challenges. 
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 During jury selection the next day, defense counsel again raised Batson challenges 
against the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes.  The prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons 
for striking some jurors that are not relevant here.  He then gave his explanation for his 
strike of Juror No. 1, a black man: 
 I just didn’t like him, Your Honor, I don’t really have a sound reason.  It was the 
 first strike I used.  I don’t know, just the way he was looking at me.  If that’s a 
 reason it’s justified, but Your Honor found there’s no pattern.  I mean I just didn’t 
 like him and he didn’t check off many boxes, but I went with my hunch, as Your 
 Honor said yesterday. 
R. at 344, Trial Tr. at 75 (Nov. 27, 2001).  The court responded, “Okay.  All right.  Let’s 
go.  Are we ready to start?”  Defense counsel then asked if the court was accepting the 
prosecutor’s reasons and denying the Batson challenges.  The court confirmed that it was. 
 On November 30, 2001, a jury consisting of nine white jurors and three black 
jurors convicted Coombs of nine counts of robbery and three counts of possessing an 
instrument of a crime.  At sentencing on February 13, 2002, defense counsel again raised 
a Batson challenge.  He sought to introduce evidence of two conversations he allegedly 
had with the prosecutor that he claimed were relevant to the prosecutor’s state of mind 
with respect to race in using his peremptory strikes.  Over repeated protests from defense 
counsel, the court declared it irrelevant and rejected the Batson argument.  The District 
Judge offered to let defense counsel submit an affidavit.  Coombs was sentenced to 59 to 
160 years in prison.   
 Less than a week later, defense counsel submitted an affidavit stating that, 
between the first and second trials, he had a conversation with the prosecutor who told 
him that in the first trial there had only been one “holdout” juror and it was a black 
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woman.  Counsel also stated that he and the prosecutor had another conversation, 
between the conclusion of the second trial and sentencing, in which the prosecutor said 
that the “holdout” juror from the first trial “had voted not guilty because the defendant 
was black and she was black.”  Coombs v. DiGuglielmo, 912 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232–33 
(E.D. Pa. 2012).  The court denied Coombs’s motion renewing the Batson claim. 
 Coombs filed a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court raising the 
Batson challenge and other claims.  The Superior Court denied them without reaching the 
merits of his claims because of Coombs’s failure to comply with Commonwealth v. 
Spence, 627 A.2d 1176 (Pa. 1993).
1
  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied leave to 
appeal.  Coombs then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. 
 The Magistrate Judge found that Coombs had failed to show that the state trial 
court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of”2 Batson 
and recommended denial of the petition.  The District Judge adopted the R&R and denied 
the petition.  Coombs appealed. 
                                              
1
 “The Spence rule requires an appellant raising a Batson challenge to make a record 
identifying the race of venirepersons stricken by the Commonwealth, the race of 
prospective jurors acceptable to the Commonwealth but stricken by the defense, and the 
racial composition of the final jury selected.”  Coombs v. Diguglielmo (Coombs I), 616 
F.3d 255, 259 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
have found the Spence rule “inconsistent with the teachings of Batson.”  Holloway v. 
Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 726 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 723 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“It is noteworthy that Batson discussed what a criminal defendant must 
do to establish a prima facie case without hinting that a defendant must always satisfy 
anything like the rigid [Spence] requirements.”). 
2
 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
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 In a precedential opinion, we stated that “when, although properly preserved by 
the defendant, the state court has not reached the merits of a claim thereafter presented to 
a federal habeas court, the deferential standards provided by AEDPA do not apply.”  
Coombs I, 616 F.3d at 260 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting 
Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)).  We also held that the District Court 
failed to properly conduct step three of the Batson analysis, which requires the court to 
show “engagement with the evidence” to determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered 
race-neutral reason for the strike was pretextual.  Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Because the District Court failed to do this, we remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
 On remand, the District Court referred the case to the Magistrate Judge to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing and draft a revised R&R.  The hearing was held on April 26, 2011, 
with both the original prosecutor, Max Kramer, and the original defense counsel, Jerome 
Mallon, testifying.  There was little new evidence on the prosecutor’s strike of Juror No. 
1.  Coombs, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 235.  Defense counsel introduced the prosecutor’s 
handwritten notes from the first trial, which included short phrases such as “L or R hand 
with gun,” “color of jacket,” and “foreperson Antipolice.”  Id.  at 236.  One of the notes 
next to a recording of an 8 to 4 jury vote says “racial lines.”  Id.3  At the hearing, Coombs 
produced evidence about the racial composition of the jury and the venire panel.  The 
panel had 9 black venirepersons (33%) and 18 white venirepersons (67%).  Id. at 236–37.  
                                              
3
 Mr. Kramer admitted that the notes were written by his hand, but did not recall writing 
them and could provide no context.  Id. 
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The prosecutor used six of the seven peremptory challenges allotted to him, five of those 
six on black venirepersons (83%).  Id. at 237.  The final jury was composed of three 
black jurors (25%) and nine white jurors (75%).  Id. 
 The Magistrate Judge recommended that the court deny the petition for the writ of 
habeas corpus.  The Magistrate Judge heard live testimony from the prosecutor, who 
testified that his strike was based on Juror No. 1’s demeanor but did not recall what 
specific characteristics troubled him.  He testified that it was not his practice in his many 
years as a prosecutor to take race into account  Id. at 238–39.  The Magistrate Judge 
found him credible and found that “he did not exercise any of his peremptory strikes in a 
discriminatory manner.”  Coombs v. DiGuglielmo, No. 04-1841, 2011 WL 9683989, at 
*9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2011).  Coombs objected only to the conclusions with regard to 
Juror No. 1. 
 The District Judge sustained Coombs’s objections, finding that the reason for 
striking, plus the evidence of the prosecutor’s notes, high rate of striking black 
venirepersons, and not striking whites who answered the jury questionnaire similarly led 
to the conclusion that it was more likely than not that the prosecutor’s proffered reason 
for the strike was a pretext for racial discrimination.  Coombs, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 239–41.  
The judge granted the writ, conditioned on the Commonwealth’s right to retry.  The 
Commonwealth filed this appeal. 
III. Discussion 
 Federal appellate review of state-court habeas decisions on the merits proceeds 
under the highly deferential standard of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2252.  In this case, 
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however, the state courts did not reach the merits of Coombs’s Batson challenge.  
Coombs I, 616 F.3d at 261.  When this occurs, the deferential standards provided for by 
AEDPA do not apply.  Id.  Therefore, in Coombs I we exercised de novo review.   Id.  
We do the same here.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253(a). 
 The Equal Protection Clause forbids the use of peremptory strikes against 
potential jurors on the basis of race.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 88–89.  Batson established a 
three-step process for determining the constitutionality of a peremptory strike.  First, the 
defendant makes a prima facie case that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge 
on the basis of race.  Coombs I, 616 F.3d at 261.  “Second, if the showing is made, the 
burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror 
in question.”  Id. (citing Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006)).  “Third, the court 
must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful 
discrimination.”  Id. (quoting Rice, 546 U.S. at 338). 
 Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a Batson 
violation.  Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality op.) (citing 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (requiring 
racially discriminatory intent for violation of the Equal Protection Clause)).  The 
prosecutor’s “subjective intent is the principal focus of a Batson challenge.” Hardcastle 
v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 257 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 
216 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Step three ultimately focuses on the prosecutor’s subjective 
motivation . . ..”); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 872 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The dispositive 
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question is the factual question of subjective intent.”).  On step three of the analysis, “the 
issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral 
explanations to be credible.”  Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). 
 District judges exercise de novo review over a Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation stemming from an evidentiary hearing conducted as part of the review 
of a habeas petition.  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).  We have held, however, that “[a] district 
court may not reject a finding of fact by a magistrate judge without an evidentiary 
hearing, where the finding is based on the credibility of a witness testifying before the 
magistrate judge and the finding is dispositive of an application for post-conviction relief 
involving the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.”  Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474, 
482 (3d Cir. 1995).  Thus, when the magistrate judge holds an evidentiary hearing that 
includes the testimony of live witnesses, a district court cannot ordinarily reject the 
magistrate judge’s credibility determinations unless it holds its own evidentiary hearing.  
The district judge may not reject those findings without holding its own evidentiary 
hearing.  See Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(“[W]e conclude the District Court improperly rejected—on a cold record—the 
Magistrate Judge’s finding.”); id. at 338 (Scirica, C.J., concurring) (concluding that the 
District Court “should hold its own evidentiary hearing if it declines to adopt the 
Magistrate Judge’s finding”). 
 The issue of intent to discriminate is a “pure issue of fact,” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 
364, that turns on the fact finder’s evaluation of the witness’s credibility, see Batson, 476 
U.S. at 98 n.21.  In this case, the Magistrate Judge made a credibility determination based 
9 
 
on the prosecutor’s statements and demeanor when testifying and concluded that the 
prosecutor did not purposefully discriminate.  Coombs, 2011 WL 9683989, at *9. 
 The Commonwealth contends that the District Court erred in rejecting the finding 
of the Magistrate Judge on a factual question without holding a new evidentiary hearing.  
We agree.  As we stated in Hill and Boyd, a District Judge may not reject a Magistrate 
Judge’s factual finding without holding its own evidentiary hearing.  Boyd, 579 F.3d at 
333; Hill, 62 F.3d at 482.  That is exactly what the District Court did in this case. 
 The dispositive question is the subjective intent of the prosecutor.  After hearing 
live testimony, the Magistrate Judge found that the prosecutor did not intentionally 
discriminate on the basis of race.  After the Magistrate Judge held the evidentiary 
hearing, the District Judge could either accept the decision or hold a new evidentiary 
hearing.  Citing Hill, 62 F.3d at 482, the District Court here acknowledged as much.  It 
chose to accept the Magistrate Judge’s assessment of credibility.   
 This determination is dispositive.  There is no reason to go on to speculate on 
pretext.  Pretext would reflect lack of credibility – and the prosecutor’s credibility was 
found by the Magistrate Judge.
4
  Once the District Court accepted the Magistrate Judge’s 
finding that the prosecutor did not subjectively intend to strike a potential juror based on 
race, the Batson step three inquiry was decided.  See, e.g., Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 
269 (3d Cir. 2008). 
                                              
4
 If, rather than finding that the prosecutor was credible, the Magistrate Judge had found 
merely that the prosecutor had offered a racially neutral explanation for the strike, pretext 
would be an appropriate issue on Step Two for further consideration in reviewing the 
Batson claim. 
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 Therefore, we will reverse the District Court’s order sustaining Coombs’s 
objections and granting the writ of habeas corpus.
5
  Based on the District Judge’s 
acceptance of the Magistrate Judge’s finding on the prosecutor’s subjective intent, we 
will remand with instructions to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation and grant judgment in favor of the Commonwealth. 
                                              
5
 Given our disposition of the appeal, we need not address the Commonwealth’s 
argument that Coombs was foreclosed from a federal evidentiary hearing under the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 
